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Abstract 
  
Empirical studies reject uncovered interest parity. Experimental and survey data studies reject 
rational expectations and find evidence of adaptive, regressive, bandwagon and distributed lag 
expectations. In this paper we investigate how these two findings are related. We show that 
uncovered interest parity test coefficients can be expressed as functions of the parameters of 
the expectations mechanisms. Negative values for uncovered interest parity test coefficients 
are explained by adaptive expectations with a high speed of learning and distributed lag 
expectations, while positive values are caused by adaptive expectations with a low speed of 
learning, regressive expectations and bandwagon expectations.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Uncovered interest parity (UIP) or forward rate unbiasedness are usually rejected in empirical 
studies. At the same time, experimental and survey evidence on exchange rate expectations 
often rejects rational expectations (and static expectations) and supports extrapolative, 
adaptive and regressive expectations. In this paper we show how these two stylized facts of 
foreign exchange are related. We show that there is a relationship between the variables and 
parameters of the prevailing expectations mechanism and the sign and size of the UIP-test-
coefficient. 
A persisting stylized fact of foreign exchange is the rejection of uncovered interest 
parity in empirical data, also known as the forward premium puzzle. Empirical tests of 
uncovered interest parity or forward rate unbiasedness1 are based on the following regression 
equation: 
 
( ) t* 1t1tt IIs e+-b+r=D --                                                                                                     (1) 
 
where Dst indicates the change in the log nominal exchange rate between period t-1 and t, It-1 
the domestic nominal interest rate and I*t-1 the foreign nominal interest rate in period t-1. 
Under rational expectations, uncovered interest parity2 implies that b = 1. However, an 
abundance of empirical evidence rejects uncovered interest parity or forward rate 
unbiasedness, see for example surveys by Hodrick (1987), Froot & Thaler (1990) and Engel 
(1996). Froot & Thaler (1990) conclude that the UIP-test-coefficient b found in the empirical 
literature is always smaller than the theoretically implied value of one, the average value 
being –0.88. In a more recent study, Chinn & Meredith (2002) find an average value of –0.8 
for 3-, 6- and 12-month horizons for the period 1980-I to 2000-I. However, Baillie & 
Bollerslev (2000) and Flood & Rose (2002) show through five year rolling regressions that in 
the 1990s the UIP-test-coefficient is often positive and sometimes even larger than one, but 
still significantly different from one and also very heterogeneous across countries. Meredith & 
Ma (2002) show that during the second half of the 1990s, the UIP-test-coefficient drops below 
zero again in rolling regressions. 
                                                             
1 Under covered interest parity, the forward premium ft-1- st-1 is identical to the interest differential It-1 – I*t-1. 
Hence tests of uncovered interest parity and tests of forward rate unbiasedness are equivalent. 
2 The possibility of a constant risk premium is captured by r. 
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Since the empirical test in (1) is based on the joint hypothesis of rational expectations 
and a constant risk premium, two obvious explanations for the forward premium puzzle are 
expectational error and the existence of a time-varying risk premium. Froot & Frankel (1989) 
use survey data on exchange rate expectations to decompose the deviations from UIP into 
deviations caused by expectational error and deviations caused by a time-varying risk 
premium. They find that by far the largest part of deviations from UIP are caused by 
expectational error, while the time-varying risk premium plays a minor role. However, the 
results of MacDonald & Torrance (1989), Taylor (1989) and Cavaglia et al. (1994) indicate an 
important role for a time-varying risk premium, in addition to expectational error. A 
theoretical study by Jeanne & Rose (2002) shows that in a flexible price monetary model the 
UIP test coefficient is decreasing in the share of noise traders in the market. 
Small sample bias (‘peso problem’) and endogeneity bias (related to monetary policy) 
play an additional role in explaining outcomes of UIP tests. Flood & Rose (1996) estimate the 
effect of the peso problem on the UIP-test-coefficient to be minor, about –0.5, hence it does 
not explain the considerably larger deviations from UIP, which especially occur for freely 
floating exchange rates (which face a smaller peso problem). More recently, Flood & Rose 
(2002) find negative values for the UIP-test-coefficients for fixed and flexible exchange rates, 
but positive values for crisis countries that have experienced a regime shift, indicating that the 
reduction of the peso problem has improved the performance of UIP for crisis countries. As a 
matter of fact, Flood & Rose (1996) even find values considerably larger than one in UIP-
tests for crisis countries, such as Finland and Malaysia (2.56 and 2.07 at the three month 
horizon). Chinn & Frankel (2002) find a value of 1.214 for the crisis-ridden EMS-currencies 
and –1.483 for non-European currencies at the three month horizon. Flood & Taylor (1997) 
find that UIP performs much better at longer horizons, which is consistent with short run 
monetary policy endogeneity bias (McCallum (1994)). Chinn & Meredith (2002) and 
Meredith & Ma (2002) generalize the McCallum model to show that monetary policy 
responses to exchange rate movements contribute to the failure of short run UIP. 
In this paper we try to explain the forward premium puzzle by investigating the 
implications of another stylized fact of foreign exchange: the rejection of rational (and static) 
expectations in survey data on exchange rate expectations and the support for extrapolative, 
adaptive and regressive expectations at horizons (1,3,6,12 months) at which uncovered 
interest parity is usually tested (Bank of Japan (1989), Cavaglia et al. (1993), Dominguez 
(1986), Frankel & Froot (1987a) and (1987b), Froot & Frankel (1989) and (1990), Ito (1990)).  
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The survey evidence on expectations formation in foreign exchange markets is supported by 
recent experimental evidence. Bloomfield & Hales (2002) show that even if subjects know 
that a time series follows a random walk, they will not hold static expectations (which is the 
rational expectations solution in this case). Instead their beliefs will switch between a trending 
regime and a mean-reverting regime, depending on the observed frequency of price reversals. 
After a high number of reversals, they think they are in a mean-reverting regime, while after a 
low number of reversals, they think they are in a trending regime. The experimental results 
are consistent with the model of investor sentiment by Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny (1998) and 
confirm that subjects believe in the “law of small numbers” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 
Rabin, 2002), a manifestation of the representativeness heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1973) and overreliance on unreliable data (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). The tendency to 
perceive patterns in a random series can also be seen as a form of overconfidence, see for 
example Glaser, Langer & Weber (2003).  
Belief in mean reversion or trending is also dependent on the time horizon. The survey 
evidence of Frankel & Froot (1987b) indicates that traders are more inclined to distributed lag 
and regressive expectations (mean-reverting expectations mechanisms) for longer horizons, 
while bandwagon expectations (trend following expectations mechanism) are more important 
at short horizons. This is confirmed by Taylor & Allen (1992), who show that foreign 
exchange dealers consider fundamentalism to be more important for long horizons, while 
chartism receives a higher weight at short horizons. It is also consistent with evidence of 
short-term positive autocorrelation and long-term negative autocorrelation of excess returns3 
(Cutler, Poterba & Summers (1991), Froot & Ramadorai (2002)), which in turn can be 
explained by recent models of short run underreaction and and long run overreaction in asset 
markets. Hong & Stein (1999) show that gradually diffusing private information in asset 
markets (such as order flow in the foreign exchange market, see for example Lyons (1997)) 
leads to underreaction in the short run from which momentum traders can benefit, causing 
overreaction in the long run which may be exploited by contrarians. Daniel, Hirshleifer & 
Subrahmanyam (1998) argue that overconfidence about private information and self-
attribution in processing public information lead to underreaction to public signals –  and 
positive autocorrelation in the short run – and overreaction to private signals, which after a 
correction causes negative autocorrelation in the long run. Barberis, Shleifer & Vishny (1998) 
                                                             
3 More precisely: under extrapolative expectations with respect to exchange rate returns, the expected partial 
autocorrelation in excess returns Dst+I*t-1-It-1  is equal to the expected autocorrelation in exchange rate returns 
Dst. 
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suggest that conservatism in updating beliefs leads to underreaction to news with low strength 
of evidence and high weight of evidence (Griffin & Tversky (1992)) and positive 
autocorrelation in the short run, while the representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman  
(1971)) causes overreaction to news with high strength and low weight and – after a 
correction – negative autocorrelation in the long run. 
Learning from forecast errors, i.e. adaptive expectations, also finds strong support 
from experimental and empirical studies, in addition to survey data. Several experiments 
provide support for adaptive expectations and reject extrapolative expectations and rational 
expectations (Schmalensee (1976), Williams (1987), Smith, Suchanek & Williams (1988), 
Hey (1994)). An empirical study by Chow (1989) shows that present value models of stock 
prices and interest rates that are rejected by the data when the rational expectations 
assumption is imposed, are accepted under adaptive expectations.  
To summarize, the experimental and survey evidence suggests that expectations 
formation may take the form of extrapolative expectations (both bandwagon and distributed 
lag expectations), adaptive expectations and regressive expectations. The objective of this 
paper is to investigate the implications of these standard exchange rate expectations 
mechanisms for the outcomes of uncovered interest parity tests.   
Two earlier simulation studies suggest that this is a promising approach to explain the 
values of uncovered interest parity test coefficients that we find in the empirical literature. 
Monte Carlo experiments with a representative agent model of forward foreign exchange 
market equilibrium without a risk premium by Zietz (1995) generate a small negative value 
for the UIP-test-coefficient (-0.009) in case of static expectations and a positive value of 
0.804 for a weighted average of static and rational expectations. De Grauwe et al. (1993) 
show that a chaotic monetary model with a representative agent who combines chartist and 
fundamentalist information is able to generate negative UIP-test-coefficients between –2.20 
and –1.74 in the absence of a risk premium.  
We prove that in a representative agent model with a constant risk premium, the 
uncovered interest parity test coefficient can be expressed as a function of the parameters of 
the expectations mechanism and the interest rate processes. We show that these analytic 
results provide a robust explanation of uncovered interest parity test outcomes, when we take 
into account the market microstructure through simulations of a multi-agent model with a 
time-varying risk premium. Markets with bandwagon expectations yield positive coefficients, 
while distributed lag expectations lead to negative coefficients. As the absolute size of the 
bandwagon or distributed lag expectations parameter shrinks, the absolute size of the UIP-
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test-coefficient increases. Regressive expectations are most likely to generate positive 
coefficients, which are larger as the expected adjustment towards the fundamental exchange 
rate decreases. Adaptive expectations tend to exhibit positive coefficients when traders adapt 
their expectations slowly and yield negative coefficients when learning increases. Our 
approach offers an explanation of the usual findings of UIP-test-coefficients smaller than one 
and even smaller than zero and more recent findings for the early 1990s of certain UIP-test-
coefficients larger than one. The latter finding is of particular interest, since the noise trader 
model by Jeanne & Rose (2002) explains only values smaller than one. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we derive the 
relationship between the value of the UIP-test-coefficient and the parameters of the 
expectations mechanism and the interest rate processes in a representative agent model with 
extrapolative, adaptive and regressive expectations and a constant risk premium. Section 3 
takes into account the market microstructure by extending the analysis to a multi-agent model 
with a time-varying risk premium. In section 4 we perform uncovered interest parity tests on 
simulations of the multi-agent model for different expectations mechanisms. In section 5 we 
draw conclusions on the relationship between exchange rate expectations and the outcomes of 
uncovered interest parity tests. 
 
 
2. Representative agent model  
 
2.1 Extrapolative expectations  
 
In this section we develop a theoretical model based on the survey evidence on exchange rate 
expectations and empirical evidence on the time series properties of interest rates. The first 
building block of the model are the tests for perfect substitutability in the survey data studies 
by Frankel & Froot (1987b) and Froot & Frankel (1989) that support the following uncovered 
arbitrage condition:  
 
p+-=D +
*
tt
e
1t IIs                                                                                                                   (2) 
 
where p is a risk-related deviation from perfect substitutability that does not change over time. 
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The second element is the survey evidence on exchange rate expectations that rejects rational 
expectations in favor of extrapolative, adaptive and regressive expectations. The final 
ingredient is the persistence in interest rates found in empirical studies. In a representative 
agent model with a constant risk premium4 and persistent interest rates, the relationship 
between the extrapolative, adaptive and regressive expectations mechanisms and the 
outcomes of uncovered interest parity tests can be derived in a straightforward manner. 
First consider a situation where the representative agent forms extrapolative 
expectations (Metzler (1941), Goodwin (1947)):  
 
1tt
e
1t ss)1(s -+ a+a-=                                                                                                            (3) 
 
Empirical estimates of a at the three month horizon range from –0.07 to 0.58 (Frankel & 
Froot (1987a), (1987b), Bank of Japan (1989), Froot & Frankel (1990), Cavaglia et al. 
(1993)). Three cases of this expectations mechanism can be distinguished. If a > 0, the 
expected exchange rate is a distributed lag of the observed exchange rate, hence this case is 
known as ‘distributed lag expectations’. By rewriting this expectations mechanism as 
 
t
e
1t ss Da-=D +                                                                                                                           (4) 
 
it is clear that agents with distributed lag expectations expect an exchange rate increase to be 
followed by a decrease in the future. On the other hand, if a < 0, agents expect an exchange 
rate increase to be followed by a further increase in the future. This case is therefore known as 
‘bandwagon expectations’. Finally, if a = 0, agents expect the exchange rate to remain at the 
current level, hence this case is called ‘static expectations’. Notice from uncovered interest 
arbitrage condition (2) that in this case the risk premium must be time-varying and identical to 
the interest differential. Hence in this section we will assume that a ¹ 0 for extrapolative 
expectations traders. As mentioned in the introduction, this assumption is supported by 
evidence from surveys and experiments. If we combine uncovered interest arbitrage condition 
(2) with expectations mechanism (4) we obtain 
 
                                                             
4 Since there is also survey evidence supporting the existence of a time-varying risk premium and heterogeneity 
in expectations, we will develop a multi-agent model with a time-varying risk premium in the next section. 
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( )*ttt II1s -a-=D                                                                                                                     (5) 
 
Empirical studies show that interest rates are highly persistent, for example Perron (1988), 
Rose (1988) and Stock & Watson (1988) find evidence of a unit root. However, Campbell & 
Perron (1991), Cochrane (1991) and DeJong et al. (1992) argue that unit root tests have low 
power against stationary alternatives in small samples. Wu & Zhang (1996) show that it is 
more likely that interest rates are highly autocorrelated but stationary. We can represent this 
property by a first order autoregressive process:  
 
t1tt II h+q= -                                                                                                                          (6) 
 
*
t
*
1t
**
t II h+q= -                                                                                                                        (7) 
 
For simplicity, we assume identical parameters 0 < q = q * < 1. Now exchange rate returns 
can be expressed in terms of the lagged interest rate differential as follows: 
 
( ) ( )*tt* 1t1tt 1IIs h-ha--a
q
-
a
p
-=D --                                                                                 (8) 
 
This suggests that for a given interest rate parameter q, there is a direct link between the 
estimated coefficient of the uncovered interest parity test and the prevailing expectations 
mechanism, as shown in figure 1. The sign and the size of the expectations parameter a 
determines the sign and size of the UIP-test-coefficient b found in empirical studies. From 
another perspective, the estimated coefficient can be used to infer the prevailing expectations 
parameter. Notice that values of the UIP-test-coefficient between -1 and 1 require an 
expectations parameter a that is larger in size than the autocorrelation q of the interest rate 
differential process. This outcome is not very likely, as the empirical evidence suggest that q 
is in the neighborhood of unity (Perron, 1988, Rose, 1988, Stock & Watson, 1988, Wu & 
Zhang, 1996) and survey data estimates (Frankel and Froot, 1987a, 1987b, Bank of Japan, 
1989, Froot and Frankel, 1990, Cavaglia et al., 1993) put a between -0.10 and 0.60. Hence 
distributed lag expectations are able to explain the large negative values of UIP-test-
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coefficients that are typical for empirical studies, while bandwagon expectations offer an 
explanation for more recent findings of values larger than one for the early 1990s. 
 
Figure 1: Extrapolative expectations and uncovered interest parity test coefficients 
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2.2 Adaptive expectations 
 
Adaptive expectations (Cagan (1956), Nerlove (1958)) played an important role in 
macroeconomics before the 1970s when rational expectations (Muth (1961)) became the 
standard assumption (Redman (1992)). Agents are said to hold adaptive expectations if they 
adjust their previous exchange rate expectations in the direction of the most recently observed 
exchange rate: 
 
( ) ette 1t ss1s a+a-=+                                                    (0 < a < 1)                                         (9) 
 
Empirical estimates of a at the three month horizon range from 0.07 to 0.19 (Frankel and 
Froot, 1987a, 1987b, Cavaglia et al., 1993). Adaptive expectations can be rewritten by 
backward substitution as 
 
( ) ( ) e 1t
2
1tt
e
1t ss1s1s --+ a+a-a+a-=                                                                               (10) 
 
hence 
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( )1te 1t2te 1t ssss --+ -a+Da-=D                                                                                           (11) 
 
With uncovered arbitrage condition (2) and autoregressive interest rate processes (6) and (7) 
this implies 
 
( ) ( ) ( )*tt1te 1t* 1t1tt 1ssIIs h-ha--a+-a
q
-
a
p
-=D ----                                                      (12) 
 
The exchange rate return is a function of the lagged interest rate differential, the lagged 
expectational error and the interest rate innovations. The lagged expectational error is a 
function of the entire history of exchange rates st-1, st-2, ... as can be shown by backward 
substitution. The uncovered interest parity test coefficient under adaptive expectations will 
tend to be negative, as interest rates exhibit positive autocorrelation. For larger values of a, 
the coefficient will be smaller in size (see figure 2). However, the lagged expectational error 
causes an omitted variable bias in the UIP-test-coefficient. Notice from the coefficients of the 
first two terms that for larger values of the adaptive expectations parameter a, the omitted 
variable bias grows.  
 
Figure 2: Adaptive expectations and uncovered interest parity test coefficients 
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2.3 Regressive expectations 
 
Regressive expectations play a crucial role in the overshooting model of Dornbusch (1976) 
and can be traced back to Keynes (1936) who suggested that financial markets expect interest 
rates to regress to a ‘normal’ level. Agents are characterized by regressive expectations if they 
expect the (logarithm of the) future exchange rate to move in the direction of some 
fundamental or long run equilibrium value qt: 
 
( )tte 1t sqs -a=D +        (a > 0)                                                                                                 (13) 
 
Positive estimates of a for regressive expectations at the three month horizon range from 0.01 
to 0.09 (Frankel and Froot, 1987a, 1987b, Bank of Japan, 1989, Froot and Frankel, 1990). If 
we assume that fundamentals follow a random walk 
 
qt = qt-1 + nt            (E[nt] = 0)                                                                                                    (14) 
 
then from uncovered interest arbitrage condition (2) it follows that 
 
( ) p+-=-a *tttt IIsq                                                                                                           (15) 
 
and one period earlier 
 
( ) p+-=-a ---- * 1t1t1t1t IIsq                                                                                             (16) 
 
If we subtract (16) from (15), substitute (14) and rearrange we obtain 
 
( ) ( ) t*tt* 1t1tt II1II1s n+-a--a=D --                                                                                       (17) 
 
Notice that the risk term p has dropped out of the equation. If we assume autoregressive 
interest rate time series given by (6) and (7) with identical parameters q = q*, we obtain: 
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( ) ( ) tt*t* 1t1tt 1II1s n+h-ha+-a
q-=D --                                                                             (18) 
 
The correlation between current exchange rate returns and lagged interest differentials will 
tend to be positive, since a > 0 and q < 1. Regressive expectations lead to positive UIP-test-
coefficients, which are smaller as the regressive expectations parameter a increases, see 
figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3: Regressive expectations and uncovered interest parity test coefficients 
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3. Market microstructure 
 
3.1 Heterogeneous expectations  
 
The market microstructure literature is based on the idea that the representative agent 
approach is unable to explain essential features of foreign exchange markets - such as the 
huge volume of trade, excessive market volatility and persistent deviations from 
macroeconomic fundamentals - which are better explained by heterogeneous agents (Frankel 
et al. (1997)). Evidence from survey data points to considerable individual heterogeneity in 
the expectations formation of traders (Ito (1990), Taylor & Allen (1992) and MacDonald & 
Marsh (1996)). Since expectations formation is the crucial ingredient in the explanation of 
uncovered interest parity test outcomes developed in this paper, we have to take this aspect of 
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the market microstructure into account5. In order to test the robustness of the analytic results 
derived in section 2, we therefore extend the analysis to a microeconomic model consisting of 
heterogeneous risk-averse agents who perform uncovered interest arbitrage based on their 
exchange rate expectations and a mean-variance utility function. We allow for heterogeneity 
with respect to exchange rate expectations, risk aversion, initial endowments of domestic and 
foreign interest-bearing assets and the currency in which investment performance is 
evaluated. This multi-agent model also generates a time-varying risk premium, conform 
evidence from survey data by MacDonald & Torrance (1989), Taylor (1989) and Cavaglia et 
al. (1994), which stands in contrast with the findings of a constant risk premium by Frankel & 
Froot (1987b) and Froot & Frankel (1989) discussed in section 2. 
 
 
3.2 Multi-agent model6 
 
Assume that there are m domestic traders and n foreign traders operating in a financial system 
consisting of a one period domestic money market with interest rate It, a one period foreign 
money market with interest rate I*t and a spot foreign exchange market with exchange rate St. 
Let Et,i(St+1) denote the expectation of domestic trader i in period t concerning the future 
exchange rate St+1 and let Vart,i(St+1) be the variance of St+1 that domestic trader i anticipates 
in period t. Based on the expected utility function of Newbery (1988), the optimal foreign 
currency position of domestic trader i can be derived as 
 
Y
I E S I S
I Var St i
t t i t t t
t t i t i t
,
*
,
*
, ,
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
=
+ - +
+
+
+
1 1
1
1
2
1g
                                                                                  (19) 
 
where the second order condition requires the parameter of absolute risk aversion gt,i to be 
positive. The expectations of domestic traders are specified in their most general form as 
follows:   
 
E S S Zt i t t t it i t i, ,( ) , ,+
-=1
1 a a                                                                                                    (20)  
 
                                                             
5 See the survey of the literature by Sarno & Taylor (2002) for the role of expectations in foreign exchange 
market microstructure. 
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where Zt,i = St-1 in case of extrapolative expectations, Zt,i = Et-1,i(St) in case of adaptive 
expectations and Zt,i = Qt in case of regressive expectations. Traders do not anticipate 
volatility clusters, conform empirical evidence on horizons at which uncovered interest parity 
tests are usually performed (1, 3, 6, 12 months). For example, Baillie & Bollerslev (1989) 
show that ARCH effects in daily and weekly exchange rates do not appear in monthly 
exchange rates. Therefore we assume that the anticipated variance of St+1/St does not change 
over time: 
 
Var S St i t t i t, ,( )+ =1
2w                                                                                                             (21) 
 
With analogous definitions of expectations and risk aversion for foreign trader j, the implicit 
expression for the equilibrium exchange rate follows from (19), (20) and (21) as: 
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where Bt,i is the foreign currency endowment of domestic trader i in period t and A*t,j the 
domestic currency endowment of foreign trader j. In the simulations we will assume that the 
prevailing equilibrium exchange rate is selected by a Walrasian auctioneer who uses the 
Newton-Raphson algorithm with initial value St-1 to compute the nearest real-valued root of 
the polynomial of equation (22).  
 
  
3.3 Simulations 
 
The purpose of the simulations is to test the robustness of the relationship between the 
prevailing expectations mechanism and the outcome of the uncovered interest parity test. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
6 This model is based on Marey (2004), to which the reader is referred for details. 
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Therefore we will assume that during each simulation all traders use the same varia ble Zt,i = Zt 
to form expectations with a time-invariant weight at,i = ai that is different for each trader. In 
each experiment we draw ai from a lognormal distribution with expected value a. In this way 
we can corroborate the analytical results derived in section 2, by performing simulations of 
bandwagon expectations markets (Zt = St-1, a < 0), distributed lag expectations markets (Zt = 
St-1, a > 0), adaptive expectations markets (Zt = Et-1(St), a > 0) and regressive expectations 
markets (Zt = Qt, a > 0) for different values of a. Each simulation will involve 200 agents: m 
= 100 domestic traders and n = 100 foreign traders. The duration of each simulation is 100 
periods, which corresponds with 25 years of quarterly observations7. The initial values and 
evolution of wealth, risk aversion, anticipated variance, expectations parameters, interest rates 
and the fundamental exchange rate are as described in Marey (2004), with the exception of 
the first order autocorrelation parameter of domestic and foreign interest rates, which we set 
here at 0.98.  
 
 
4. Uncovered interest parity tests on simulations 
 
Experiments with each market type discussed in section 3 are performed for different values 
of the expectations parameter a. For each a, 100 simulations with a duration of 100 periods 
are run and the uncovered interest parity test is performed on each simulated time series: 
 
( ) t* 1t1tt IIs e+-b+r=D --                                                                                                   (23) 
 
Hence for each market type and each a, 100 estimates of the UIP-test-coefficient b are 
obtained. Each simulation is characterized by a different set of initial values and evolutions of 
exogenous variables. Hence each simulation represents a different realization of heterogeneity 
and a different path of the time-varying risk premium. Tables 1-4 show the results of the 
uncovered interest parity tests, in particular the mean value of the estimated b over 100 
simulations for each a, the standard deviation and the 5th and 95th percentiles. 
                                                             
7 The survey evidence is most extensive for the three month horizon. The empirical estimates of a at this horizon 
mentioned in section 2 will be used as a criterion for the range of values of a simulated in section 4. 
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For the bandwagon expectations market8, we consider values of the average a between 
-0.25 and -0.05. As table 1 shows, bandwagon expectations (a < 0) generate positive values 
for b. In fact, the lowest value for all simulations is 1.70 (a = -0.25). In addition, when a 
moves towards 0 the value of b tends to increase. The mean value of b shows a monotonous 
increase as a function of a, the same holds for the 5th and 95th percentiles. In other words, 
the simulations confirm the robustness of the analytical results in subsection 2.1. The 
percentiles also indicate that, depending on the risk premium and trader heterogeneity, a 
market with an a closer to zero than another market may very well have a lower value of b. 
Hence one cannot simply infer the underlying expectations parameter a from an estimated 
coefficient b. However, higher positive values of b are more likely to be caused by 
extrapolative expectations with negative a closer to 0. Table 1 gives an indication of the 
probability distribution of b, where the uncertainty is caused by the time-varying risk 
premium and  trader heterogeneity. Bandwagon expectations offer an explanation for recent 
findings for the early 1990s of UIP-test-coefficients larger than one, when the peso problem is 
accounted for (as is the case with our simulations), in particular for crisis countries. 
 
 
Table 1: UIP-test-coefficients in case of bandwagon expectations 
a Mean value of  b Standard deviation 
of b 
5th percentile of b 95th percentile of b 
-0.25 2.38 0.24 1.97 2.78 
-0.20 2.82 0.31 2.25 3.32 
-0.15 3.62 0.49 2.79 4.45 
-0.10 4.88 0.71 3.55 6.08 
-0.05 8.62 1.45 6.21 11.12 
 
 
For the distributed lag expectations market9, we consider values of the average a 
between 0.10 and 0.60. From table 2 we see that distributed lag expectations (a > 0) lead to 
negative values for b. Actually, the highest value for b is –2.11 (for a = 0.50). In addition, 
higher values of expectations parameter a cause an upward shift in the mean value of the 
                                                             
8 As mentioned in subsection 2.1, empirical estimates of a for extrapolative expectations range from -0.07 to 
0.58. 
9 See previous footnote. 
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estimated values of UIP-test-coefficient b. These mean values fall within the spectrum of 
estimates of empirical studies. The simulations show that the analytical results derived in 
subsection 2.1 are robust and that distributed lag expectations are able to explain the usual 
findings of negative UIP-test-coefficients, in particular for freely floating exchange rates.  
 
Table 2: UIP-test-coefficients in case of distributed lag expectations 
a Mean value of  b Standard deviation 
of b 
5th percentile of b 95th percentile of b 
0.10 -7.81 1.49 -10.37 -5.45 
0.20 -5.30 1.12 -7.22 -3.98 
0.30 -4.19 0.59 -5.23 -3.29 
0.40 -3.49 0.59 -4.41 -2.57 
0.50 -2.99 0.41 -3.68 -2.39 
 
 
For the adaptive expectations market10, we consider values of the average a between 
0.05 and 0.30. Table 3 shows that, unlike bandwagon and distributed expectations, the 
adaptive expectations markets are able to generate both negative and positive values for b, in 
particular when the expectations parameter is large enough (a ³ 0.20). The mean value of b 
increases as a function of a, as do the 5th and 95th percentiles (except for the 95th percentile 
when a moves from 0.25 to 0.30). Hence as the weight a given to the previous forecast 
increases, so does the value of b. From a different perspective, as the weight 1-a given to the 
current exchange rate increases, i.e. learning increases, the value of b decreases. In subsection 
2.2 we expected to find negative mean values for b, with a possible exception for larger 
values of a because of the growing omitted variable bias. The simulations show that the 
omitted variable bias starts affecting the UIP-test-coefficients at a = 0.20 by generating a 
number of positive values of b, while at a = 0.25 even the mean value of b turns positive. 
Adaptive expectations are able to explain a wide spectrum of outcomes for UIP-tests: (large) 
negative values, positive values smaller than one and even values larger than one. 
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Table 3: UIP-test-coefficients in case of adaptive expectations 
a Mean value of  b Standard deviation 
of b 
5th percentile of b 95th percentile of b 
0.05 -11.06 3.00 -15.91 -6.19 
0.10 -6.09 1.67 -9.18 -3.42 
0.15 -4.62 1.03 -6.40 -3.22 
0.20 -2.51 2.25 -5.04 1.51 
0.25 0.29 1.44 -2.68 1.96 
0.30 0.18 1.18 -2.02 1.92 
 
 
For the regressive expectations market11, we consider values of the average a between 
0.01 and 0.10.  From table 4 we see that the mean values for b are all positive. However, a 
small number of negative values are found for all a (the largest being –1.16 for a = 0.03), 
except 0.01 and 0.06.  The mean b falls as the expected speed of adjustment towards the 
fundamental exchange rate a increases, except between 0.04 and 0.05 and between 0.09 and 
0.10. Regressive expectations parameter values of 0.08 and higher are more likely to generate 
UIP-test-coefficients between zero and one, while lower values of a offer an explanation for 
recent findings of UIP-test-coefficients larger than 1. The overall picture indicates that the 
analytical results in subsection 2.3 are fairly robust. 
 
Table 4: UIP-test-coefficients in case of regressive expectations 
a Mean value of  b Standard deviation 
of b 
5th percentile of b 95th percentile of b 
0.01 5.43 3.08 1.66 11.71 
0.02 3.28 1.86 1.20 7.87 
0.03 2.40 1.39 0.79 4.56 
0.04 1.60 0.97 0.25 3.47 
0.05 1.66 1.13 0.25 3.66 
0.06 1.38 0.80 0.31 2.97 
0.07 1.09 0.65 0.09 2.18 
0.08 0.91 0.61 -0.05 2.05 
0.09 0.85 0.70 -0.02 1.95 
0.10 0.86 0.74 -0.21 2.12 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
10 From subsection 2.2 we know that empirical estimates of a range from 0.07 to 0.19. 
11 In subsection 2.3 we established that positive estimates of a for regressive expectations range from 0.01 to 
0.09. 
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The simulations confirm that the analytical results derived in section 2 offer an 
explanation of uncovered interest parity test outcomes that is robust with respect to trader 
heterogeneity and a time-varying risk premium. The 5th and 95th percentiles of UIP-test-
coefficients generated by the expectations mechanisms simulated in this paper are 
summarized in figure 4. The (often large) negative values for UIP-test-coefficients frequently 
found in empirical studies are best explained by adaptive expectations with fast learning and 
distributed lag expectations. Positive values smaller than one are most likely explained by 
regressive expectations and adaptive expectations with slow learning. Recent findings of UIP-
test-coefficients larger than one for the early 1990s are best explained by bandwagon 
expectations and regressive expectations. Notice that until recently (Flood & Rose (1996)), 
such large positive UIP-test-coefficients were ‘novel facts’, for example Froot & Thaler 
(1990) conclude that empirical studies always yield coefficients smaller than one. Our 
expectational error approach offers the first explanation of UIP-test-coefficients larger than 
one. 
 
 
Figure 4: Uncovered interest parity test coefficients and expectations mechanisms 
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5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper we show that there is a relationship between the variables and parameters of the 
prevailing expectations mechanism in the foreign exchange market and the sign and size of 
coefficients of uncovered interest parity tests. Bandwagon expectations lead to positive values 
for the uncovered interest parity test coefficients and are able to explain recent findings for the 
early 1990s of UIP-test-coefficients larger than one, in particular for crisis countries. When 
the size of the bandwagon expectations parameter shrinks, the UIP-test-coefficients increase. 
Distributed lag expectations are able to explain the usual findings of negative UIP-test-
coefficients, in particular for freely floating exchange rates. Smaller values of the distributed 
lag expectations parameter lead to larger negative UIP-test-coefficients. Adaptive 
expectations are able to generate a variety of outcomes for UIP-tests: the usual (often large) 
negative values and positive values smaller than one and the more recently observed values 
larger than one. A higher speed of learning leads to lower values of the UIP-test-coefficient. 
Regressive expectations explain both positive values between zero and one, and recent 
findings for the early 1990s of UIP-test-coefficients larger than one. A higher degree of 
fundamentalism leads to smaller values of the UIP-test-coefficient. 
Having determined which outcome for uncovered interest parity tests is most likely 
when a certain expectations mechanism prevails, the next question is under what 
circumstances does a certain expectations mechanism prevail in the foreign exchange market? 
The evidence from experimental and survey data (Bloomfield & Hales (2002), Frankel & 
Froot (1987b), Taylor & Allen (1992)) suggests that bandwagon expectations are more likely 
in periods with few price reversals and at higher frequencies (short horizons), while 
distributed lag expectations and regressive expectations are more likely in periods with many 
price reversals and at lower frequencies (long horizons).  
Another issue is that different expectations mechanisms may be at work 
simultaneously. In this paper we consider markets consisting of traders with different use of 
information ai, but identical sources of information Zt. This allows us to investigate the 
effects of the various standard expectations mechanisms on the outcomes of uncovered 
interest parity tests. However, there is evidence that foreign exchange market participants 
combine different expectations mechanisms, in particular chartist and fundamentalist methods 
(Taylor & Allen (1992)). Hence further study could shed light on the relationship between the 
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variables and parameters of these hybrid expectations mechanisms and the outcomes of 
uncovered interest parity tests.  
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